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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RAYMOND MICHAEL QUNITANA, : Case No. 20030534-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is a consolidated appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
in two cases involving second degree felonies for burglary. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
202 (Supp. 2003). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code 
Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002), which grants this Court jurisdiction over cases 
not involving a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The time period for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea does not run if the 
trial judge fails to inform the defendant of the statutory time limits. Although the trial 
judge informed Appellant, Raymond Michael Qunitana, that he must file a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing, the plea affidavit provided that Appellant 
could file the motion up to 30 days after sentencing. Did the trial judge err in concluding 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that Appellant's motion to withdraw, filed several days after sentencing, was untimely? 
Whether a motion to withdraw a guilty plea was timely presents a question of law 
which this Court reviews for correctness. State v. Tarnawiecki. 2000 UT App 186, ^ [6, 5 
P.3d 1222. Appellant preserved this issue by filing a motion to withdraw the guilty plea 
in the trial court. R.211: 104.' 
STATUTE AND COURT RULE 
Utah Code Annotated section 77-13-6 (Supp. 2003) (amended effective May 5, 
2003) sets forth the time limits for filing motions to withdraw pleas: 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to 
conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only 
upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly 
and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except 
]This appeal is a consolidated appeal from district court case numbers 021911211 
and 021911684. Mr. Quintana appealed separately from both cases. On July 28, 2003, 
this Court, on its own motion, consolidated these cases for appeal and instructed the 
parties to refer only to appellate case number 20030534. Because this consolidated 
appeal has separate records on appeal, this brief refers to the record from the appeal in 
district court case number 021911211 as "R211." This brief also refers to the record 
from the appeal in district court case number 021911684 as "R684.M
 ( 
The volumes marked 80 in case number 021911684 and 127 in case number 
021911211 refer to the May 8, 2003, plea hearing. The volumes marked 81 in case 
number 021911684 and 126 in case number 021911211 refer to the May 12, 2003, 
sentencing hearing. To simplify the page references, this brief will only refer to volumes 
80 and 81 in case number 021911684 ("R684."). i 
".
 :
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for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before 
sentence is announced. Sentence may not be announced unless 
the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to 
withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading 
guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time 
period specified in Subsection (2)(c) shall be pursued under 
Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 
65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 details, in relevant part, the requirements for 
trial judges to review in accepting guilty pleas and the time limits for withdrawing a 
guilty plea: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or 
guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the 
court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she 
has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire 
counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of 
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right 
to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of 
the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is 
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is 
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has 
3 
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sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of 
the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to 
which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion 
and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal 
is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the 
defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting 
these factors after the court has established that the defendant 
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
sworn statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English 
language, it will be sufficient that the sworn statement has been 
read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is 
not required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral 
consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing 
any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be 
the ground for extending the time to make a motion under 
Section 77-13-6. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On September 20, 2002, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Quintana 
with over 20 counts of burglary and theft-related charges. R211: 23-27. The State later 
amended the Information and charged three counts of burglary and three counts of theft. 
R211: 43. On October 9, 2002, the State filed a second Information charging Mr. 
4 
( 
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Quintana with one count each of burglary and theft. R684: 2. 
On May 8, 2003, Mr. Quintana signed a plea affidavit in which he agreed to plead 
guilty to one count of burglary in each case. R211: 92; R684: 52; Addendum A. In 
exchange for the guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend concurrent sentences. R211: 
96; R684: 56. The plea affidavit informed Mr. Quintana in bold letters that if he wished 
to withdraw his guilty pleas, he "must file a written [m]otion to withdraw my plea(s) 
within 30 days after I have been sentenced and final judgment has been entered .ff 
R211:97;R684:57. 
At a hearing on May 8, 2003, Judge Sheila McCleve informed Mr. Quintana of 
some of his constitutional rights, explained the factual basis for the charges, listed the 
possible punishments, and accepted his guilty pleas. R684: 80 at 2-5; Addendum B. Mr. 
Quintana also informed Judge McCeleve that he had read and understood the plea 
affidavit. Id, at 4-5. Addressing Mr. Quintana, Judge McCleve then stated, "You have 
up until the time of sentencing to move to withdraw the plea for good cause.1' R684: 80 
at 5. Judge McCleve did not ask Mr. Quintana if he understood this time limitation, and, 
instead, immediately went on to discuss whether to order a presentence investigation 
report. Id. 
Defense counsel indicated that a presentence report had already been prepared for 
a separate sentencing hearing before Judge Robin Reese that was scheduled for the 
following week. IcL at 5-6. Instead of preparing a separate report and conducting two 
5 
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sentencing hearings, defense counsel suggested that Judge McCleve allow Judge Reese 
to sentence Mr. Quintana on all three cases at once. Id. at 6. Both Judge Reese and 
Judge McCleve agreed to this procedure. IcL at 6-7; R684: 81 at 1. 
On May 12, 2003, Judge Reese sentenced Mr. Quintana to three terms of one to 
15 years in the state prison. R684: 81 at 9-10; Addenda C, D. Despite the prosecutor's 
recommendation to concurrently impose the two sentences under the plea agreement, 
Judge Reese ordered all three sentences to run consecutively. R684: 81 at 10. On May 
15, 2003, three days after sentencing, Mr. Quintana filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas in both cases in which he pleaded guilty. R211: 104.2 No grounds are specified in 
the motion. 
The State opposed the motion, claiming that it was untimely. R211: 107. 
Specifically, the State noted that the legislature had amended Utah Code Annotated 
section 77-13-6(2)(b), to require defendants to file motions to withdraw guilty pleas 
"before sentencing." R211: 107 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (Supp. 2003). Prior 
to this amendment, defendants could file motions to withdraw guilty pleas up to 30 days 
after sentencing. See State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68, ^ [11,31 P.3d 528. The amendment 
became effective on May 5, 2003, three days before the guilty plea hearing. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-13-6 (Supp. 2003) (Amendment notes). 
2Although a copy of the motion is not included in the record for case number 
021911684, the motion lists both case numbers in its caption. R211: 104. 
6 
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On May 27, 2003, Judge McCleve denied the motion as untimely. R211: 110. 
Judge McCleve did not hold a hearing before denying the motion. Mr. Quintana filed 
notices of appeal in both cases on June 26, 2003. IcL at 112; R684: 66.3 Mr. Quintana 
remains incarcerated pending the outcome of this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Although this Court has held that it lacks jurisdiction over appeals from the denial 
of an untimely motion to withdraw a guilty plea, this rule does not apply when trial 
courts fail to inform criminal defendants of the time requirements for filing motions to 
withdraw. The plea affidavit below misinformed Mr. Quintana that he had up to 30 days 
after sentencing to file a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Judge McCleve failed to 
correct this error at the plea hearing and never determined whether Mr. Quintana 
understood that he must file a motion to withdraw before sentencing. This Court should 
reverse that ruling and remand this case for a hearing on Mr. Quintana's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. A remand is especially needed because Judge McCleve failed 
to hold a hearing or to afford Mr. Quintana an opportunity to be heard on his motion. 
3This Court has jurisdiction to entertain appeals from the denial of motions to 
withdraw guilty pleas. State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 & n.2 (Utah 1987); State 
v. Dean. 2002 UT App, 323, TJ5, 57 P.3d 1106, cert, granted 64 P.3d 586 (Utah 2003) 
(citing Gibbons). 
7 
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ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE MR. QUINTANA WAS MISINFORMED 
ABOUT THE TIME PERIOD FOR FILING A MOTION 
TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS, HIS MOTION 
WAS TIMELY AND THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN 
DENYING HIS MOTION WITHOUT A HEARING 
Although trial judges ordinarily cannot hear an untimely filed motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea, the 30-day period for filing such motions does not apply to criminal 
defendants who are not informed of this time limit. Here, Mr. Quintana was not properly 
informed of the applicable time period because the plea affidavit stated one period, Judge 
McCleve described another, and the law changed during plea negotiations. Further, 
Judge McCleve never determined whether Mr. Quintana understood the time 
requirements for filing a motion to withdraw his pleas. Given the substantial loss of 
numerous rights when pleading guilty, this Court should remand this case to the trial 
court for a hearing on Mr. Quintana's motion. 
Judge McCleve failed to follow Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting 
Mr. Quinatana's guilty pleas. "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of 
ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty 
plea is entered.'5 State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). This duty requires 
"strict compliance" with the rule. State v. Abevta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993). Strict 
compliance means "'that the trial court [must] personally establish that the defendant's 
guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant 
8 
( 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights."' State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, Tfl 1, 22 
P.3d 1242 (quoting Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995 (emphasis in original)). 
"Strict compliance, however, does not mandate a particular script or rote recitation 
of the rights listed." Id. Rather, the key is whether the trial court informed the defendant 
of those rights and whether the defendant understood them. Id. at ^12. In determining 
whether the trial court has carried out this duty, this Court looks to the entire record 
including the oral plea canvass and any written statements by the defendant. Id. But, 
trial courts must ensure that "'no requirement of the rule is omitted.'" Id. (quoting State 
v. Maguire. 830 P.2d 216. 218 (Utah 1991)). 
Judge McCleve erred in ruling that Mr. Quintana's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea was untimely because Mr. Quintana was not adequately informed of the time period 
for filing such motions. The failure to file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
"extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea on appeal." 
State v. Reves. 2002 UT 13, T[3, 40 P.3d 630. However, Rule 11(f) provides that 
"[f]ailure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a 
plea of guilty . . . is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for 
extending the time to" file a motion to withdraw. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f). In State v. 
Price, 837 P.2d 578, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), overruled on other grounds . State v. 
Ostler. 2001 UT 68, ^ fl3, 31 P.3d 528, this Court interpreted that provision as excusing 
the time requirements for filing motions to withdraw "if the defendant is not advised" of 
9 
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those requirements. State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, \1, 5 P.3d 1222 
(reiterating holding in Price); State v. Canfield. 917 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(upholding Price). "[WJhere a trial court fails to properly admonish a defendant as to the 
[] limitation for filing a motion for leave to withdraw a guilty plea . . . the defendant may 
attack the judgment at any time...." People v. Johnson, 773 N.E.2d 155, 156-57 (111. 
App. Ct. 2002). 
Here, Mr. Quintana was not properly advised of the time limits for filing a motion 
to withdraw his guilty pleas. Utah Code Annotated section 77-13-6(2)(b) (Supp. 2003) 
details the time requirements for filing motions to withdraw pleas. At the time Mr. 
Quintana was charged with his crimes, criminal defendants had up to 30 days after "entry 
of final judgment" following sentencing to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. State 
v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68,1J13, 31 P.3d 528 (interpreting former Utah Code Ann. §77-13-
6(2)(b)). But, three days before Mr. Quintana entered his guilty pleas, an amendment to 
section 77-13-6 became effective that required defendants to file motions to withdraw 
guilty pleas "before sentence is announced." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (Supp. 
2003) (amendment effective May 5, 2003). Mr. Quintana filed his motion to withdraw 
his guilty pleas three days after sentencing in violation of this amendment. R684: 104. 
But, Mr. Quintana was never properly informed of this change in the law. In fact, 
although the plea affidavit was completed after the amendment to section 77-13-6, it 
highlighted the time requirements under the prior law. The affidavit read, in bold type 
10 
( 
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face, tfI understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I 
must file a written [m]otion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been 
sentenced and final judgment has been entered." R211: 97; R684: 57. Thus, 
assuming that Mr. Quintana correctly represented at the plea hearing that he had read and 
understood the plea affidavit, he believed that he could request to withdraw his guilty 
plea up to 30 days after sentencing. R684: 80 at 4-5. 
Judge McCleve failed to correct this misinformation at the plea hearing. While 
discussing several other matters, Judge McCleve stated in passing, "You have up until 
the time of sentencing to move to withdraw the plea for good cause." IdL. at 5. She then 
quickly moved on to discuss with defense counsel the need for a presentence report. IdL 
at 5-6. Judge McCleve never stopped to ask Mr. Quintana if he understood this new time 
period nor did she inform him that the law had changed. Thus, Judge McCleve never 
"
6personally'" determined whether Mr. Quintana understood the new time limits for 
filing a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^11, 22 P.3d 1242 
(quoting Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995). 
Trial judges' duty to ensure that defendants understand the consequences of a 
guilty plea demand concluding that the plea affidavit controls over Judge's McCleve 
passing statements. Trial judges may use plea affidavits to determine the voluntariness 
of a guilty plea when they have "incorporated" the plea affidavit into the record by 
determining that defendants have "read, understood, and acknowledged the affidavit." 
11 
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State v. Mora. 2003 UT App 117,1J20, 69 P.3d 838. Judge McCleve did exactly that 
when Mr. Quintana informed her that he had read and understood the plea affidavit. 
R.211: 80 at 4-5. Thus, unlike Judge McCleve's passing reference to the amended law, 
the record affirmatively shows that Mr. Quintana understood the plea affidavit, including 
the provision on withdrawing guilty pleas up to 30 days after sentencing. In any event, 
Judge McCleve should shoulder the burden of any misunderstandings over the time 
period because trial judges have a duty to clarify '"any omissions or ambiguities'" that 
arise in the plea affidavit or during the plea colloquy. Mora., 2003 UT 117, |19, 69 P.3d 
838 (quoting State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470. 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
Judge McCleve's failure to correct Mr. Quintana's misunderstanding of the law 
excused Mr. Quintana's late filing of his motion to withdraw. Price specifically allows 
criminal defendants to file late motions "if a defendant has not been informed of the 
thirty-day time period." 837 P.2d at 583. This Court's recent decisions make this 
conclusion clear. TarnwieckL 2000 UT App 186, f7, 5 P.3d 1222; State v. Canfield . 917 
P.2d 561, 562. Further, although the Utah Supreme Court overruled Price 's 
interpretation of former section 77-13-6 in Ostler, that Court has never disturbed Price's 
holding on informing defendants of time requirements for withdrawing their guilty pleas. 
2001UT68,Tfl3,31P.3d528. 
The strict compliance doctrine endorses this conclusion. As detailed above, trial 
judges have a duty to " 'personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly 
12 
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knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived 
his or her constitutional rights.5" Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^[11,22 P.3d 1242 (quoting 
Abevta, 852 P.2d at 995 (emphasis in original)). Moreover, trial courts must ensure that 
"'no requirement of [Rule 11] is omitted.'" Id (quoting State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 
218 (Utah 1991)). Rule 11 (e)(7) specifically requires trial judges to ensure that "the 
defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(7). Judge McCleve failed to determine whether Mr. Quintana 
understood these time limits. Although this omission does not allow Mr. Quintana to 
withdraw his plea, it does allow him to nextend[] the time to make a motion under 
Section 77-13-6." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f). 
Due process concerns demand allowing Mr. Quintana to pursue his motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas. First, given the serious consequences of pleading guilty and 
its attendant waiver of constitutional rights, "the Constitution insists, among other things, 
that the defendant enter a guilty plea that is 'voluntary' and that the defendant make the 
related waivers 'knowingly, intelligently, [and] with sufficient awareness of the relevant 
circumstances and likely consequences.'" United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 
(2002) (quoting Bradv v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). Mr. Quintana did 
not "knowingly" plead guilty because he did not understand the time limitations on 
requesting withdrawal of his guilty pleas. State v. Stilling. 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). It would be grossly unfair to penalize Mr. Quintana when the trial court 
13 
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failed to inform him of the procedures he needed to know to challenge his guilty pleas. 
Second, Judge McCleve denied Mr. Quintana's motion without a hearing. Had 
the judge held a hearing, defense counsel could have explained not only the confusion 
over the timeliness of the motion to withdraw but also the grounds for withdrawing the 
plea. Instead, Judge McCleve summarily concluded that the motion was untimely 
without allowing Mr. Quintana to be heard. This case is almost identical to State v. 
Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 994 (Utah 1993), in which the trial court denied as untimely a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the motion to 
withdraw was timely because the law listed no time requirements when the defendant 
filed the motion. Id at 995. To remedy this error, the Supreme Court Mvacate[d] the 
dismissal and remand[ed] th[e] case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing" on the 
merits of the defendant's motion. Id at 996; see also State v. West. 765 P.2d 891, 896 
(Utah 1988) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to determine the voluntariness of guilty 
plea). 
Likewise, because Judge McCleve erroneously concluded that Mr. Quintana filed 
a late motion, this Court should remand this matter for a hearing. The denial of a hearing 
raises the kind of "constitutional problems" mentioned in Ostler that would occur if 
procedural limitations prevented defendants from challenging their guilty pleas. 2001 
UT 68, TflO, 31 P.3d 528. Although Ostler discussed the problem of depriving the 
defendant of the right to appeal, this case raises similarly strong constitutional issues 
14 
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concerning Mr. Quintana's right to be heard and to challenge whether he pleaded guilty 
knowingly and voluntarily. 
In any event, assuming that this Court allows Mr. Quintana to pursue his motion 
to withdraw, a hearing will be necessary because Mr. Quintana can appeal from the 
denial of the motion. Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1311 & n.2; Dean, 2002 UT App, 323, j^5, 57 
P.3d 1106. Without a hearing, this Court cannot adequately review the merits of the trial 
court's decision on the motion. Banhi v. State, 555 S.E.2d 513, 514 & n.l (Ga. Ct. App. 
2001). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Quintana requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea and to conclude that his motion was timely. 
Submitted this .ftt day of October, 2003. 
KENT R.HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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FILED 
MAY 0 8 2003 
3rd DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
7fy*to/A ft - Jlx//f7**f4 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. #&/*//{, f?/=f 
0 2 \*[H 111 
Defendant. 
I. . herebv acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and risks: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
A. 
B. 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
Degree 
i 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
y
 a Minimum Mandatory A 
JUL r> £rt 
JtGO£iqf,JLJ/F* 
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I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me, I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
/&^^JU*S : 
\fr>^ 
q AMUde^LA-J 
r 4A^4^, 6+4+ 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or. if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or. if I am pleading no contest. I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest): 
j£ff£ 
Waiver of Constitutional Ri«hts 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand 
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that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the 
appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I(mave nop (ba*^ waived my rights to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel. I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my rights to counsel, my attorney is /Jjvtb * f^fOS 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement. m\ rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) pleats}. 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have 
a jury trial, a ) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against 
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right \- n attorney, would have the 
opportunity io cross-examine all of the witnesses who te.-.iif^ -d against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial. I could call 
witnesses if I chose to. and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the 
State would pay those cost. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a jury trial. I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. 
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my 
refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead 
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the 
charged crime! s). If I choose to fight the charges against me. I need only plead "not guilty," 
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving 
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each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the 
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all 
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty. I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term. fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (859c) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). Tknow that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my/fuilty^pijao contostj^lea(sniow may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me.- ffihe offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
i 
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Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea bargain, if any. are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: . ~ y " „ ^ ^> 
Qba^ faCUttAfl&tU. 
£ 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know thati am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am Vj years of age. I have attended school through the /&- grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants 
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under 
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering mv plea. 
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written notion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced 
and final judgment has been entered, I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I 
show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any 
reason. 
Dated this jff^day of ^ f l t ^ L . , 2C&*. 
DEFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attornev 
I certify that I am the attorney for. , the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her: I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY F G T W W D A N T 
Bar No/fo3£V 
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify th^kl anythe attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
Qffa/yifrw£ fft » PUU&(faa\ , defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant 
anc/find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage 
a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the 
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the 
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction 
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance 
of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Bar No. ^&6f f 
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Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in this Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this u day of 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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RAYMOND M. QUINTANA, 
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801-523-1186 
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APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: ANNE A. CAMERON 
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
For the Defendant: DAVID C. BIGGS 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - MAY 8, 2003 
JUDGE SHEILA K. MCCLEVE PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Sorry to keep you waiting so long. 
MR. BIGGS: It's alright, we needed the time. Your 
Honor, we've come to a disposition on this case and if we can 
bring Mr. Quintana out I'll explain it to you. 
This is Ray Quintana. 
THE COURT: Sure. We'll do appearances. State v. 
Raymond Michael Quintana. 
MS. CAMERON: Anne Cameron for the State. 
MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, David Biggs, Legal Defender's 
office for Mr. Quintana. Mr. Quintana is present. 
THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, in these particular two 
matters what we've greed to do, Mr. Quintana has agreed to do 
is plead to two second degree burglaries, one burglary out of 
each file. Those burglaries being those burglaries which his 
fingerprints were found. They are second degree felonies, the 
maximum punishment as Mr. Quintana is aware is 1 to 15 in the 
State Prison and a $10,000 fine plus an 85 percent sir charge. 
I've gone over the elements of the offenses, Your Honor. I've 
gone over the factual basis for the plea. Mr. Quintana and I 
have also gone over all of his constitutional rights manifest 
in the document which I'm referring to and incorporating by 
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reference and he is prepared to sign that in open court this 
morning. 
THE COURT: Okay. Tell me, is it Count 1 in case 
ending 1211 because there's the — 
MR. BIGGS: They're all the same burglary language 
but Ms. Cameron would like the victims to be particular victims 
and she has the names. 
THE COURT: So in Count 1 it's Judith Cluff and in 
Count 5 it's Jeff Fugate, I guess? 
MS. CAMERON: No. 
THE COURT: And then in Count 3 it's Leonard Reynold? 
MS. CAMERON: That is correct for 1211, ending 1211. 
He is pleading guilty to - if you need a specific count for him 
to plead guilty to? 
THE COURT: I do. 
MS. CAMERON: It would be Count 1 Judith Cluff. 
THE COURT: Okay, Count 1. That's what I wanted to 
know. 
MS. CAMERON: I'd also like the other victims 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: That's fine. That's fine. And then in 
case 1684, there's only the one second degree there and that's 
Jim Stefan and Esther Stefan, right? 
MS. CAMERON: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. So do you understand that, Mr. 
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Quintana? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes I do, Your Honor. | 
THE COURT: You would be in case ending 1684 j 
admitting that you committed a second degree burglary at 780 J 
East Loveland Avenue on or about September 23, 2002 and that j 
j 
you entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of Jim 
Stephan and Esther Stefan with the intent to commit a theft. 
You understand that? i 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. | 
i 
THE COURT: Okay. And in case ending 1211, you would! 
i 
be admitting that you at 5670 South Highland Drive, on or about j 
September 13 of 2002 entered or remained unlawfully in the 
dwelling of Judith Cluff with the intent to commit a theft also 
a second degree felony burglary and as Mr. Biggs said 1 to 15 
on each. They can be added on top of each other rather than 
run at the same time and you give up all those constitutional 
rights you have to make the State bring in the witnesses, put 
them on the stand, be able to have Mr. Biggs ask them 
questions, have a jury for that matter decide your guilt or 
innocense and to be able to appeal from any errors of law that 
might be made. All those constitutional rights that you enjoy, 
you understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: And you've talked with Mr. Biggs about 
and you appreciate that you're giving those up? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. And that you are convicting 
yourself, in other words, the same as if we went through the 
trial and you were found guilty of those offenses I've just 
talked to you about. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I realize that. 
THE COURT: You understand all of that, okay. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: So you know what the penalties are. You 
know what your rights are. You know what the charges are. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: And other than what the attorneys have 
told me, they haven't forced you into this or promised you 
anything? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. 
THE COURT: You're not under the influence of any 
medication, drugs, anything that would effect your judgment? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. 
THE COURT: So you know what you're doing, you know 
what the charges are, you know what the penalties are. 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: And you understand the rights you give 
up. You've been through how much school? 
THE DEFENDANT: High school. 
THE COURT: Okay, enough that you can read and write? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: And you read through that form, went over 
it, had a chance to ask Mr. Biggs any questions you had? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have. 
THE COURT: So, to Count 1, case ending 1211, 
burglary, second degree felony at 5670 South Highland Drive, 
September 13, 2003 how do you plead? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. In case ending 1684, burglary, 
second degree felony at 780 East Loveland Avenue, September 23, 
2002, how do you plead? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. We'll accept your guilty pleas to 
both those counts and grant the State's motion to dismiss the 
remaining counts? 
MS. CAMERON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you can sign that if you haven't done 
that already. We'll have you execute that now and that will be 
further evidence that you understand your rights and the 
charges and the consequences or penalties to you. You have up 
until the time of sentencing to move to withdraw the plea for 
good cause. 
And I'm assuming we need pre-sentence report if for 
nothing more than restitution amounts. 
MR. BIGGS: Let me tell you what we're asking the 
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Court to do. | 
THE COURT: Okay. | 
i 
i 
MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, in this particular matter, \ 
Mr. Quintana went to jury trial in another burglary under Judge | 
Reese, approximately a month ago and his sentencing is set for j 
Monday in front of Judge Reese. Pre-sentence report has j 
already been prepared. I am asking you to send these two cases 
to Judge Reese for sentencing. Mr. Quintana agrees and will 
stipulate to the restitution on these matters and I don't think! 
i 
that there's anything necessary needful to get on these j 
particular matters and Mr. Quintana would like to get going. j 
So what we're asking the Court to do is send these two to Judge; 
Reese for sentencing although the other is set for Monday next, j 
MS. CAMERON: I have no objection, Your Honor. j 
THE COURT: All right. You've got to check with J 
Judge Reese. If he'll take it and do it, I'll send it to him. j 
Otherwise - do you want me to give you backup date just in 
case? And I would do an addendum to the pre-sentence report if 
I need to do it, if he doesn't feel like he wants to take it. 
There's nothing that requires him to do that but he well may 
and if he's willing to do it, he certainly can. 
MR. BIGGS: Certainly, Your Honor. Why don't you give 
us a two week date then. 
THE COURT: What I expect is that he'll take it and 
we'll just strike it so just pick a day. Just so I don't lose 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
1 I it we'll do it June 2nd at nine. And I'll have my clerk 
2 ! deliver this to his clerk if he'll just let us know he's 
3 !: accepted it. 
MR. BIGGS: He's downstairs. 
THE COURT: He's down on three. He's on this same 
wing. 
MR. BIGGS: I'm going to go down there right now. 
THE COURT: All right. And these are all your 
witnesses? 
MS. CAMERON: These are the witnesses. 
THE COURT: I apologize to all of your for keeping you 
12 ; waiting. As I understand it, it resolved the matter so that we 
i 
13 | didn't do the trial anyway and hopefully it did it in a way 
j 
14 | that you're all satisfied and we certainly appreciate your 
I 
15 | participation and your patience and I guess Ms. Cameron will 
16 | speak to you further. You're all excused and we'll let you go. 
17 j And Mr. Quintana, I expect Judge Reese will do this 
18 j so good luck to you. 
19 j THE DEFENDANT: Alright, thank you. 
20 I THE COURT: We'll excuse counsel on that. 
21 [ (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
22 i 
23 
24 
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CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in 
the before mentioned hearing held before Judge Sheila 
McCleve was transcribed by me from a video recording and 
is a full, true and correct transcription of the requested 
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to the best 
of my ability. 
Signed this 31st day of July, 2003 in Sandy, 
Utah. 
Carolyn Er/ickson 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Certified Court Transcriber 
My Commission expires May 4, 2006 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CAROLYN ERICKSON 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAYMOND MICHAEL QUINTANA, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marlened 
Prosecutor: CAMERON, ANNE A 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BIGGS, DAVID C. 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 23, 1958 
Video 
Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count: 10:53 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/08/2003 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 021911211 FS 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
Date: Mav 12, 2 0 03 
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Case No: 
Date: 
021911211 
May 12, 2003 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
C/O TO RUN CONSECUTIVE 
Dated this day of , 20 
ROBIN W. REESE 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 (last) 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
RAYMOND MICHAEL QUINTANA, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 021911684 FS 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
Date: May 12, 2003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marlened 
Prosecutor: CAMERON, ANNE A 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BIGGS, DAVID C. 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 23, 1958 
Video 
Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count: 10:53 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/08/2003 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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